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The Politics of Innovation 
THIS ESSAY PROVIDES A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE on the process of innovation in American communications. It is drawn from a larger, ongoing study of communications policy in 
the post-office department, Western Union, and the Bell System 
in the formative era that stretched from the adoption of the 
Constitution to World War I. This period holds special interest 
for students of innovation, since it witnessed the establishment 
of a modern postal system as well as the commercialization of 
the electric telegraph and telephone—three of the most notable 
improvements in communications technology during the past 
two hundred years. 
It is my hope that this brief account can provide some insight 
into the innovative process in other complex social institutions, 
such as primary education. To facilitate comparison, innova-
tion is defined broadly to include conceptual advances as well 
as technical breakthroughs, and the innovative process is un-
derstood to embrace the diffusion as well as the origination of 
novel methods and ideas. 
Communications and education, of course, differ in many 
ways. Communications has long been one of the most dynamic 
sectors of American society, while education, with a few no-
table exceptions, is among the most stable. Nonetheless, several 
themes in the history of communications would seem to be 
re levant for educa t iona l r e fo rmers . These inc lude the 
inescapability of politics; the indispensability of a broad, uni-
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versalistic mandate; and the instrumentality of competition as 
a catalyst for change. The history of communications also 
introduces a note of caution for educational reformers frus-
trated with the status quo. Even in communications—a realm 
far less hemmed in by societal constraints—the innovative pro-
cess has never been smooth or straightforward. At the very 
least, the dynamism of American communications may provide 
something of a template against which educational reform can 
be gauged. If a particular innovative strategy failed in commu-
nications, it is not likely to succeed in education. 
The earliest—and, very possibly, the most fundamental—inno-
vation in American communications took place in mail deliv-
ery. Beginning in the 1790s, the government undertook for the 
first time to provide a geographically far-flung population with 
regular, time-sensitive information about commerce and public 
affairs. Prior to the 1790s, news had been confined to the 
Atlantic seaboard; by 1828, it had become ubiquitous through-
out much of the vast trans-Appalachian hinterland. Almost two 
decades before the commercialization of the electric telegraph, 
the United States experienced a communications revolution 
that would exert a far-reaching influence on the pattern of 
everyday life. In 1832, the respected political theorist Francis 
Lieber made this point in a compelling way. The modern postal 
system, Lieber declared in an encyclopedia entry, deserved to 
be ranked, alongside the printing press and the mariner's com-
pass, as "one of the most effective elements of civilization.'" 
While the American postal system in the early republic al-
most never receives more than incidental notice from histori-
ans, it was in fact the keystone of an elaborate communications 
infrastructure that included the stagecoach industry and the 
newspaper press. Indeed, its social effects were so wide-rang-
ing that it can be usefully characterized as a technological 
system, giving it priority—ahead of the railroad and the electric 
telegraph—as one of the earliest of the great technological 
systems of the modern age.2 
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Among the outstanding postal administrators in the early 
republic was John McLean, postmaster general between 1823 
and 1829. McLean expanded service, regularized administra-
tive procedures, and instituted a meritocratic personnel policy 
that, had it not been repudiated by the Jacksonians, might well 
have become a prototype for the modern civil service. In tribute 
to McLean's achievement, and to the growing role of mail 
delivery in American life, President Andrew Jackson officially 
designated the postal system a government department in 1829. 
By this time, it was by far the largest organization in the United 
States. 
The single best measure of the growing role of the postal 
system in the early republic is the rapid expansion in the num-
ber of post offices during the first few decades of the new 
nation's existence. When the Constitution was ratified in 1788, 
the postal system embraced a mere sixty-nine offices, almost all 
of which were strung along the Atlantic seaboard in a single 
North-South chain known today as the Old Post Road. By 1800, 
the chain had become a network of nine hundred offices; by 
1828, over seventy-six hundred. Not until the 1880s would 
Western Union operate on a comparable scale.3 
The magnitude of the American achievement is particularly 
evident if one adopts an international comparative perspective. 
In the 1830s, there were twice as many post offices in the 
United States as in Great Britain and over five times as many 
as in France. In an age in which France had four post offices for 
every one hundred thousand inhabitants, and Great Britain 
seventeen, the United States boasted no fewer than seventy-
four. European observers were understandably impressed. The 
American postal system, exclaimed Alexis de Tocqueville fol-
lowing his 1831 trip to the United States, was a "great link 
between minds" that penetrated into the "heart of the wilder-
ness," bringing enlightenment to all.4 
The innovativeness of American postal policy owed little to 
technical breakthroughs in engineering or science. Well into the 
1830s, the horse remained the principal motive power. The key 
postal innovation, rather, was conceptual. Prior to the break 
with the British crown, American postal policy remained con-
strained by its fiscal rationale. No achievement garnered colo-
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nial postal administrators greater official renown than the amount 
of revenue that they returned to the treasury. In Great Britain, 
this fiscal rationale would continue to shape postal policy well 
into the twentieth century. (Indeed, the British post office would 
not run its first annual deficit until the 1950s.)5 In the United 
States, in contrast, this fiscal rationale was soon supplanted by 
a capacious commitment to civic education. In a country that 
claimed to derive its authority from the sovereignty of the 
people, it seemed self-evident that the citizenry had a right to 
be well informed.6 Postal policy in the early republic became a 
means to this end. As the political theorist Benjamin Rush 
explained in 1787, the postal system was the "true non-electric 
wire of government" and the "only means" of "conveying light 
and heat to every individual in the federal commonwealth."7 
The educational rationale for postal policy had major fiscal 
implications. Now that postal administrators were no longer 
obliged to maximize the revenue they returned to the state, they 
redirected the postal surplus to various developmental projects. 
For a time, postal administrators found it possible to fund these 
projects out of postal revenue. Beginning in the 1840s, however, 
they began to run up large annual deficits, obliging Congress to 
make annual appropriations to cover their costs. 
It is sometimes assumed that the adoption of an educational 
rationale for postal policy was an evolutionary development 
rooted in social circumstances that could be traced back to the 
colonial era. While plausible, this assumption is mistaken. Like 
so many events in the history of American communications, this 
conceptual advance was, rather, unplanned and unforeseen. No 
one in 1788, let alone 1776, could have anticipated the full 
magnitude of the changes that were about to occur. 
Consider the celebrated Federalist essays that James Madi-
son prepared during the ratification debates to help persuade 
undecided voters to ratify the Constitution in the pivotal state 
of New York. Though Madison firmly supported a stronger 
central government, he did not envision an enlarged role for 
communications. Citizens would learn about the affairs of state 
not from the press but, rather, from personal meetings with 
their representative when he returned home to meet his con-
stituents face-to-face.8 For example, in Federalist number 10— 
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the most important single piece of political theory to emerge 
from the constitutional debates—Madison treated poor com-
munications as a guarantee of political stability. Given the 
enormous territory that the new republic embraced, Madison 
explained, it was logistically impossible for tyrannical factions 
to conspire against the public good. From such a standpoint, 
communications improvements were not without their potential 
perils and, as Madison mused at the time in a private memoran-
dum, might eventually drive the republic apart.9 
Even Benjamin Franklin failed to anticipate the conceptual 
advance that would undergird American postal policy in the 
early republic. This was true even though Franklin was an 
unusually astute student of public affairs, as well as a former 
royal postal officer who, in the 1760s, had himself introduced 
various postal innovations. Indeed, Franklin's very familiarity 
with royal postal policy may well have predisposed him to 
assume that postal policy in the independent United States 
would remain broadly similar to postal policy under the Crown. 
It is perhaps not entirely surprising then that Franklin high-
lighted the administrative continuities with the colonial era 
during his brief stint in 1775 as the first postmaster general of 
the United States. 
The new, sweeping rationale for communications policy was 
institutionalized in the Post Office Act of 1792. Though this law 
has occasioned little sustained discussion from specialists in the 
period, and is almost invariably omitted from textbook ac-
counts, it deserves to be remembered as a landmark in Ameri-
can communications policy and one of the most significant 
pieces of legislation to have been enacted in the early republic. 
The text of this act includes no ringing phrases to invite histori-
cal scrutiny. Yet it established two principles that would soon 
restructure American communications in a fundamental way. 
The most important of these principles invested Congress, 
rather than the executive, with the authority to establish new 
postal routes. Since Congress could be expected to be more 
responsive to local pressure than postal administrators, this 
principle virtually guaranteed that the postal network would 
rapidly expand from the Atlantic seaboard into the trans-Appa-
lachian West. To this day, in the National Archives there are 
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thousands of petitions to Congress that testify to the determi-
nation of ordinary Americans to improve their access to news 
from afar. "We recommend that a post be established to our 
district and county towns," declared one group of South Caro-
linian petitioners in 1793, since such communications were the 
"soul of commerce!" Lacking such a "direct, regular, and im-
mediate communication by posts," the petitioners explained, 
they were "kept in ignorance," and "know not anything which 
concerns us, either as men or planters."10 Before long, ordinary 
Americans came to assume they had a right to be linked to the 
communications network, regardless of the cost. In some in-
stances, as critics did not fail to point out, this led to the 
establishment of routes that could not bear one-hundredth of 
the expense.11 
The second principle provided a series of targeted subsidies 
for the press. Not only did Congress admit newspapers into the 
mail—a major departure in its own right from colonial and 
revolutionary practice—but it also permitted them to be trans-
mitted at highly favorable rates. In addition, Congress formal-
ized a long-standing convention that enabled newspaper editors 
to gather news at a minimal cost. The results were predictable. 
During the early republic, newspapers typically made up as 
much as 95 percent of the weight of the mail, while generating 
a mere 15 percent of the revenue. Interestingly, this subsidy 
troubled few contemporaries, in part because, in this period, 
newspapers were the only item that the vast majority of postal 
patrons received.12 
Taken together, these various principles enshrined universal 
access as a defining feature of American communications policy. 
Public figures in the early republic may not have termed this 
mandate "universal service," yet it anticipated in several re-
gards the corporate philosophy that would later be championed 
in the Bell System by Theodore N. Vail. 
To accommodate the expansion in mail volume that had been 
set in motion with the Post Office Act of 1792, postal adminis-
trators established a stagecoach-based, hub-and-spoke sorting 
scheme that involved the creation of a network of distribution 
centers overseen by a team of middle managers. This organiza-
tional innovation proved surprisingly enduring and lasted until 
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the Civil War, when it was supplanted by the train-based, 
continuous-sorting scheme that came to be known as railway 
mail. For a time, Congress even underwrote the establishment 
of a rudimentary national stagecoach network by awarding 
highly advantageous mail contracts to stagecoach proprietors. 
According to one estimate, the stagecoach industry soon came 
to rely on postal contracts for as much as 33 percent of its total 
revenue.13 "Having obtained the mail contract from Milledgeville 
to Montgomery, Alabama," announced one typical broadside 
in 1826, the proprietors would soon establish a stagecoach line 
to transport passengers between these two towns.14 
So long as the postal system remained self-sustaining, the 
cost of the various cross-subsidies was borne by letter writers— 
and, specifically, by merchants and the well-to-do. Prior to the 
passage of the Post Office Acts of 1845 and 1851, which signifi-
cantly reduced the basic letter rate—ushering in what reform-
ers hailed as the age of "cheap postage"—it could cost as much 
as 50 cents to mail a single letter, a substantial sum in an age 
when many Americans made $1 a day. Not surprisingly, as late 
as the 1830s, congressmen could matter~of-factly proclaim high 
letter postage to be popular—since, by subsidizing newspaper 
carriage and rural mail routes, it benefited the many at the 
expense of the few.15 
One of the unanticipated consequences of these cross-subsi-
dies was the incentive they offered entrepreneurs to underbid 
the government on selected routes. In the period between 1839 
and 1851, a number of enterprising individuals—including William 
Harnden, Henry Wells, and James W. Hale—established inde-
pendent mail-delivery firms that competed head-on with the 
post-office department, providing postal patrons with a compa-
rable, and, in many instances, superior level of service for a 
significantly lower fee. The independents also introduced a 
number of innovations that were subsequently adopted by postal 
administrators, including mandatory prepayment, mail boxes, 
and postage stamps. 
Why these firms emerged at this time, and not earlier, is an 
open question. Yet the competitive challenge that they posed 
was unmistakable. At the height of the independent mail-delivery 
boom in 1845, as many as two-thirds of all the letter mail in the 
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country was being conveyed by nongovernmental carriers—or, 
as the phrase went, "outside of the mail."16 In the entire history 
of the U.S. Postal Service, postal administrators have never 
faced a more formidable threat. In response, Congress passed 
the Post Office Acts of 1845 and 1851, which mollified postal 
patrons by significantly lowering the basic letter rate and for-
tified the postal monopoly by plugging the legal loopholes that 
the independents had so successfully exploited. 
It is something of a puzzle why so many subsequent postal 
innovations—including city delivery, railway mail, rural free 
delivery, and parcel post—lagged behind their counterparts in 
Europe. Equally perplexing is the repeated failure of reformers 
to expand the jurisdiction of the post-office department to 
embrace telegraphy and telephony, as was common in much of 
the rest of the world. After all, in the early republic the Ameri-
can postal system had been innovative in a number of realms. 
Why did this trend not persist throughout the rest of the cen-
tury? 
At least part of the answer can be traced to the extraordinary 
sensitivity of American political leaders to the specter of politi-
cal corruption. Public figures of all political persuasions de-
plored the partisan manipulation of public office, stymieing 
reformers intent on expanding the government work force. 
Jacksonian party leaders galvanized this concern by lavishing 
an unprecedented number of postmasterships on political sup-
porters, institutionalizing the notorious "spoils system" that 
would undergird federal hiring practices until well after the 
Civil War. Indeed, to an extent that is often overlooked even by 
specialists in the period, the creation in the 1830s of the mass 
party—and, with it, the modern two-party system—owed a 
major debt to the prior expansion of the postal system in the 
period before 1828.17 
The specter of corruption played an equally conspicuous role in 
the early history of electric telegraphy. In particular, it helps to 
explain why this major technical breakthrough—the first com-
munications technology to be based on electricity—came to be 
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administered as a private enterprise. In the deregulatory cli-
mate of the late twentieth century, this outcome may seem 
unsurprising. A century ago, however, it set the United States 
apart. In this period, the United States was the only major 
industrialized country in which telegraphy was administered by 
a private corporation rather than a public agency. Yet if the 
inventor of the telegraph, Samuel F. B. Morse, had had his way, 
the United States would have diverged less markedly from the 
European norm. 
Morse's approach to telegraphy was shaped by his familiar-
ity with the optical telegraph that had been invented by Claude 
Chappe in the 1790s in revolutionary France. Chappe's tele-
graph consisted of a chain of towers—located, on average, ten 
miles apart—fitted with a pair of wooden shutters that could be 
arranged in a variety of positions. By manipulating the shutters, 
operators could transmit in just under three minutes a rudimen-
tary message from Paris to Lille, a distance of 100 miles. Most 
early messages were government dispatches; during most of its 
history, the French government prohibited ordinary individuals 
from using Chappe's telegraph at all. Chappe coined the term 
"telegraphy"—which meant, literally, "writing at a distance"— 
to describe his invention, even though it was not, strictly speak-
ing, a recording medium. The optical telegraph proved invalu-
able to Napoleon, who used it to coordinate military cam-
paigns, and it remained a mainstay of French communications 
for almost fifty years. Along with the guillotine, it deserves to 
be remembered as one of the principal technological innova-
tions to have been spawned by the French Revolution.18 
Morse's telegraph resembled Chappe's in several ways. Like 
Chappe's, it relied on relays to transmit signals over long 
distances. Chappe's relays were human; Morse's, automatic. 
French telegraph administrators referred to their human relays 
as "mutes"—which they were, quite literally, since the govern-
ment employed deaf people to staff the intermediate towers 
that were located in between the stations at which messages 
were sent and received. 
Chappe's example also influenced Morse to prepare a dictio-
nary code to translate words and phrases into a numeric form. 
Like Chappe, Morse assumed that it would take far too long to 
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transmit messages letter by letter. Only hesitantly—and at the 
prodding of his assistant, Alfred Vail—would Morse switch to 
the dot-and-dash alphabetic code that to this day bears his 
name and that has been used by telegraphers ever since. 
While Morse was well aware of his indebtedness to Chappe, 
he took pains to highlight the distinctiveness of his invention. 
First, Morse contended, it facilitated continuous, twenty-four-
hour transmission, in contrast to the optical telegraph, which 
was restricted to the daytime and good weather. Second, it 
made it possible to record messages in a permanent form— 
making the electric telegraph, as it were, the first true tele-
graph. Morse believed this feature of his invention to be a 
compelling advantage, and went so far as to suggest that op-
erators could record incoming messages in bound books, if this 
were desired.19 
Perhaps the most startling difference between Morse's tele-
graph and Chappe's stemmed from Morse's ideas regarding 
public policy. Like Chappe, Morse assumed that the govern-
ment would play a prominent role in telegraph regulation, and 
lobbied hard to persuade Congress to purchase his patent out-
right. Wary of unregulated competition, Morse hoped in this 
way to ensure that his invention would be commercialized in a 
socially responsible manner. Should the electric telegraph be 
left in the hands of "speculators" who might "monopolize it for 
themselves," Morse warned, it could easily become the means 
of "enriching the corporation at the expense of the bankruptcy 
of thousands."20 Unlike Chappe, however, Morse rejected the 
notion that his invention would be used primarily for govern-
ment dispatches. The electric telegraph, Morse posited, was but 
"another mode" of accomplishing the "principal object" for 
which the postal system had been established, "to wit: the rapid 
and regular transmission of intelligence."21 Accordingly, he 
intended it to be open to the public at large, a policy he re-
garded as "more in consonance" with the "political institutions 
under which we live."22 
Morse's faith in government control was widely shared. In an 
age in which no individual business enterprise could match the 
administrative capacity of the central government, it made 
sense for reformers to look to the state to oversee such a 
The Politics of Innovation 197 
potentially vast undertaking. In the 1830s, for example, New 
York harbormaster Samuel Reid urged Congress to establish a 
1,200-mile line of optical telegraphs between New York and 
New Orleans. Reid proposed that this enterprise be overseen by 
the post-office department, which, he believed, would help to 
guarantee the sanctity of the messages it transmitted. Though 
Congress never built Reid's line, his project had the support of 
many prominent public figures, including Postmaster General 
Amos Kendall, who hailed it as "just the thing" to supplant a 
horse express that he had established on the same route to carry 
the mail.23 
Morse's commitment to government control led him in 1843 
to secure a federal grant to build a forty-mile telegraph line 
between Washington and Baltimore. Morse completed his line 
in 1844; in the following year, he secured its transfer to the 
post-office department, where it would remain until Congress 
abandoned the idea of a government telegraph in 1847. 
While Morse favored government ownership of his telegraph 
patent, he opposed the establishment of an exclusive govern-
ment monopoly. Fearful of the "vast mischief" that such a 
powerful institution might come to exert, Morse recommended, 
as an alternative, that Congress lease the rights to various 
routes for a specified sum, promoting in this way a "general 
competition." Such an arrangement, Morse hoped, would com-
bine the advantages of private initiative and public oversight. 
It also promised to raise a good deal of money. Should the 
government take the new technology "solely under its own 
control," Morse predicted, the income derived from the leases 
alone would be of "vast amount."2 4 
Had circumstances been different, Congress might have es-
tablished a practical leasing arrangement, or conceivably even 
a government-administered system. Whig presidential contender 
Henry Clay publicly supported government control of Morse's 
invention, as did Democratic postmaster general Cave Johnson, 
albeit with the reservation that he did not see how a govern-
ment telegraph could ever cover its costs.25 
Notwithstanding a solid base of bipartisan support, Morse 
failed to prevail upon Congress; much to his chagrin, he pre-
sided over the privatization of the new technology. The reasons 
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for Morse's failure are complex, and included bad luck, techni-
cal setbacks, personality conflicts, and a tacit refusal on the 
part of Congress to increase the patronage that would be at the 
disposal of the party in power. 
Once it became evident that Congress had no intention of 
purchasing Morse's patent a swarm of entrepreneurs entered 
the field, and the American telegraph industry was born. Just as 
Morse had feared, he had inadvertently unloosed a competitive 
maelstrom, or what one telegraph historian has termed an era 
of "methodless enthusiasm."26 Industry leaders like Hiram Sibley 
did their best to bring some order to the confusion: first by 
instituting a series of pooling arrangements in the 1850s; then 
by cooperating with the Union army during the Civil War; and, 
finally, by merging several regional firms into Western Union, 
which emerged in 1866 as the first nongovernmental institution 
to operate on a truly national scale. 
The rise of Western Union did not go uncontested. Troubled 
by its high rates and limited geographical scope, industry critics 
lobbied to bring it under federal control. Though these efforts 
proved almost entirely unsuccessful, they did hasten the pas-
sage of the Telegraph Act of 1866, which granted Congress the 
authority to purchase, at a mutually agreeable price, the assets 
of every telegraph company in the United States that agreed to 
be bound by its terms. In return, the law gave consenting firms 
the right to erect telegraphic lines on any postal route in the 
country, a valuable privilege in an age in which the individual 
states continued to exercise a broad range of powers over their 
internal affairs. This agreement proved acceptable to most of 
the leading firms in the industry, including Western Union, 
whose officials came to hail it as a contractual guarantee that 
its shareholders' rights would be duly respected. 
Interestingly, Western Union's critics generated little support 
among the merchants and manufacturers who were the princi-
pal users of the new technology. From their standpoint, speed 
and accuracy—and not cost and access—were the overriding 
concerns. So long as Western Union transmitted time-sensitive 
commercial information quickly and accurately between the 
leading commercial centers, which Western Union did reason-
ably well, its business customers had little cause for complaint. 
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For industry critics, this was precisely the problem. "As a 
telegraph for business, where dispatch is essential and price is 
of little account," declared Massachusetts lawyer Gardiner 
Greene Hubbard in 1883, "the Western Union system is unri-
valed; but as a telegraph for the people it is signal failure."27 
Industry critics often contrasted Western Union's narrow, 
business-oriented focus with the much broader mandate of the 
post-office department. In urging a government takeover of the 
industry, Wisconsin Congressman Cadwallader C. Washburn 
in 1869 posited that the cost of a telegram should be low 
enough that telegraphy, like letter writing, could be accessible 
to the poor. Why, he asked rhetorically, should it cost an 
immigrant servant girl in Illinois a week's hard labor to tele-
graph a ten-word greeting to her friends back in New York?28 
"The telegraph office holds the same relation to the educational 
interests of the people that the post office does," postulated 
Iowa Congressman Frank W. Palmer in 1872. "Yet the tele-
graph office is established only where it seems to be the pecu-
niary interest of its shareholders that it should be established. 
This policy, in a country of unexampled enterprise and progress 
in other respects, is a mockery of the whole genius of our 
people."29 
Western Union officials rebutted these arguments in various 
ways. Almost invariably, they conceded Congress the right to 
buy them out under the terms of the Telegraph Act of 1866— 
provided, of course, that their shareholders were properly reim-
bursed. Yet they consistently opposed the establishment of a 
government-subsidized "postal telegraph" that would compete 
with them head-on. Competition, even more than government 
ownership, was their bete noire. This was true even though, as 
Western Union officials occasionally acknowledged, competi-
tion had not only forced major rate reductions but also signifi-
cantly expanded the industry's geographical scope. 
Should Congress nationalize the industry, Western Union 
officials warned, the consequences would be unfortunate. Ev-
ery European government ran its electric telegraph at a loss, as 
Western Union president Norvin Green observed in 1883. Should 
Congress require the industry to lower its rates and expand its 
facilities, it would have no choice but to subsidize its opera-
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tions. Yet since far more Americans paid taxes than sent tele-
grams, such a policy would be highly regressive. After all, less 
than half a million Americans ever sent a telegram, far fewer 
than mailed a letter or received a newspaper that had been sent 
through the mail. 
Green also warned of the potential political dangers of gov-
ernment control. In monarchical regimes, he observed, the gov-
ernment monopolized the telegraph in order to protect it against 
the "plots and schemes" of "disaffected and opposing elements 
or parties."30 Such a repressive policy, however, had no place 
in the republican United States. Should the government nation-
alize the industry, Green warned, it might well exert a corrupt-
ing influence over the electoral process, particularly if it aug-
mented the insidious influence that postal patronage had al-
ready come to exert. The "genius of our government," Green 
postulated, is that the "people rule." And, at least for the 
present, public sentiment was "adverse" to the "administrative 
power" having any such advantage in "directing or controlling 
the popular will."31 Elaborating on his position a few years 
later, Green remarked that, if it could indeed be demonstrated 
that telegraph rates were lower in Europe—a perennial debat-
ing point that Green refused to concede—this could be ex-
plained by the determination of European governments to "rec-
oncile the public" to the "enormous engine of power and espio-
nage" that the government telegraph had there become.32 
Far more successful than industry critics in shaping Western 
Union's business strategy were its many business rivals. West-
ern Union was particularly vulnerable to competition in the 
intra-urban market, where barriers to entry were low. Even in 
its long-distance telegraphy, it was repeatedly challenged by 
upstart rivals, of whom the most formidable was the financier 
Jay Gould. 
Gould's strategy rested not in his superior technology—for 
he had none—but rather on an artful combination of financial 
daring and political clout. Twice in the late 1870s, Gould 
cobbled together a rival telegraph network that Western Union 
officials found prudent to buy out, at a heavy cost, in order to 
avoid a full-scale rate war. "No one knows better than Gould," 
explained an exasperated Norvin Green during the midst of the 
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first of these struggles, "that an opposition telegraph in this 
country cannot be made a success as a business enterprise."33 
Still, Gould's challenge did force Western Union to drop rates 
and expand and improve service for its clientele. 
In certain circumstances, Western Union officials took the 
lead in encouraging innovation. In the 1870s, for example, 
Green's predecessor William Orton aggressively sponsored in-
ventors who promised to increase the carrying capacity of its 
telegraph lines. At the time, no wire could transmit more than 
one message in a single direction at a specific moment. To 
overcome this obstacle, Orton purchased the rights to a novel 
telegraphic apparatus that had been patented by Joseph B. 
Stearns. Stearns's invention made it possible to transmit two 
messages simultaneously over a single wire, doubling its capac-
ity. Orton hailed Stearns' duplex as the most important innova-
tion in electric telegraphy since Morse's original invention; by 
1872, an improved version was widely used on Western Union's 
lines throughout the United States.34 
Orton regarded ownership of Stearns' patent as a valuable 
competitive weapon. To protect his investment, he patented as 
many similar inventions as he could. Toward this end, Orton 
hired Thomas A. Edison, then a still-youthful tinkerer best 
known as the inventor of a stock ticker. By putting Edison on 
his payroll, as Orton explained to Stearns, Western Union 
would be able to "anticipate other inventors" and also to patent 
"as many combinations as possible."35 Edison was rather more 
candid. Orton had hired him to work on the duplex, as he later 
testified, "as an insurance against other parties using them— 
other lines."36 
Orton's decision to hire Edison led, unexpectedly, to the 
invention of an acoustic or quadruplex telegraph, a device that 
could transmit four messages on one line simultaneously, two in 
each direction. Though Orton had subsidized Edison's quadruplex 
research, he somehow failed to acquire for Western Union the 
necessary patent, and, for a time, Edison dangled his invention 
before Western Union's competitors, including Jay Gould. 
The quadruplex debacle was the final chapter in Western 
Union's brief experiment in the active sponsorship of new tech-
nology. Under the leadership of Green, who became president 
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shortly after Orton's death in 1878, the firm returned to its 
prior strategy of purchasing promising inventions on the open 
market. Lacking a firsthand knowledge of electrical technology 
and convinced that the telegraph industry had become techno-
logically mature, Green assumed that Western Union's control 
of key duplex and quadruplex patents guaranteed it a dominant 
position in the field.37 
Green's conservative business strategy shaped his decision in 
November 1879 to cede the nascent telephone industry to Wil-
liam H. Forbes, the president of a small and struggling start-up 
firm that was then known as National Bell. Had Western Union 
remained in telephony—then an infant industry but a mere 
three years old—it might well have emerged as a leading player. 
Western Union controlled several key telephone patents, had a 
major ownership stake in one of the country's leading manufac-
turers of electrical equipment, and owned the American Speak-
ing Telephone Company, which ran successful telephone ex-
changes in several cities, including New York and Chicago. Yet 
Green preferred to compromise, and, after extensive negotia-
tions with Forbes, turned Western Union's telephone patents 
over to National Bell in return for a seventeen-year royalty on 
every telephone that National Bell leased and a monopoly over 
interurban telegraph messages originating in National Bell's 
local telephone exchanges. Since at this time telephony was 
confined to a geographical range of approximately 30 miles, 
Green believed that he had struck an excellent bargain. Hence-
forth, Western Union would focus on the long-distance commu-
nications market, and Bell on the local loop.38 
To this day, it is by no means certain why Green gave up on 
the telephone. Green's official correspondence makes it plain 
that he fully recognized its commercial potential and, especially 
in his earliest negotiations, had much confidence in Western 
Union's patent position. Though Green's negotiations with Forbes 
did occur during the same months that Green was immersed in 
a fierce competitive struggle with Gould, there are few hints in 
Green's correspondence that Gould's threat influenced Green's 
decision to sell out. Far more important was Green's revulsion 
at the prospect of a competitive struggle. "I have had much 
difficulty" in winning the consent of my associates, Green 
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confessed to Forbes, shortly before they closed the deal, since, 
among other things, Green's associates had been legally ad-
vised that "we shall have less difficulty in continuing the use of 
our telephones than you will in yours." Yet, Green added, in the 
end Western Union and its allies were willing to concede a 
portion of what they "firmly believe they are entitled to" for the 
"sake of peace and harmony" and to "avoid the trouble, loss, 
and expense of a wasteful competition."39 
Equally shortsighted was Green's decision three years later 
to sell to Forbes Western Union's controlling interest in West-
ern Electric, the principal manufacturer of Western Union tele-
graph equipment. Once again, Green defended the spin-off as 
simple common sense, since, as he explained to an associate, 
"everything in our line that we manufacture costs us more than 
we could buy it for."40 Yet from the standpoint of hindsight, it 
was another major missed opportunity. Within a few decades, 
Western Electric would evolve into Bell Labs—one of the lead-
ing research facilities in the modern world—while Western 
Union would suffer the indignity of being taken over in 1910 by 
AT&T, the successor firm to Forbes's National Bell. 
The early history of telephony demonstrates how a different, 
more expansive business strategy could, under the right circum-
stances, hasten the rise of what would become, by World War 
I, one of the largest and most innovative institutions in the 
country. The origins of AT&T date back to February 1876, 
when Western Union scourge Gardiner Greene Hubbard se-
cured a patent for a novel communications device that had been 
recently invented by Alexander Graham Bell. 
Hubbard initially had little interest in Bell's experiments in 
telephony. As a keen student of telegraphy, however, he recog-
nized that Bell's research in voice transmission had great rel-
evance to the quest for an acoustic telegraph—which, like a 
quadruplex, could transmit multiple messages over a single 
wire. When, in 1874, Hubbard learned that no patent for an 
acoustic telegraph had yet been issued, he urged Bell to turn his 
energies in this direction.41 
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To Hubbard 's chagrin, Bell had little interest in acoustic 
telegraphy and continued to experiment with voice transmis-
sion. A teacher of the deaf, he hoped to devise a means to 
improve their ability to communicate. Among his pupils was 
Hubbard's deaf daughter, Mabel, with whom he had fallen in 
love and who he hoped to marry. Hubbard begrudgingly con-
ceded the merits of Bell's invention, and when Bell devised a 
workable telephone, Hubbard secured him two key patents. In 
July 1877, Hubbard organized the Bell Telephone Company to 
exploit the telephone commercially. Two days later, Bell mar-
ried Mabel in Hubbard's front parlor. According to a well-
known and very likely apocryphal story, the previous fall Hubbard 
had offered to sell Bell's first telephone patent to Western Union 
president William Orton for $100,000. Only when Orton re-
fused—or so the story goes—did Hubbard turn his attention to 
transforming the Bell Telephone Company into a viable busi-
ness enterprise.42 
The telephone industry, like the telegraph industry before it, 
crystallized around the control of key patents. None were more 
important than the two patents Hubbard secured for Bell. In the 
period between 1876 and 1894, when the Bell Company en-
joyed a patent monopoly, Bell lawyers won over six hundred 
infringement suits, giving the fledgling firm a major competitive 
boost. 
Hubbard 's business strategy combined a vigorous defense of 
patent rights with the energetic recruitment of agents to set up 
operating companies in various localities. To retain a modicum 
of control over these firms, Hubbard decided to lease, rather 
than sell, its patented telephone apparatus and to acquire an 
ownership stake in the operating companies. Typically, Bell 
licensees solicited subscribers in a relatively small geographical 
area, such as a city or town, who they then connected to a 
central switchboard or exchange. Few of the operating compa-
nies interconnected, since technical constraints kept telephony's 
range to about thirty miles. 
Hubbard's strategy helped to insure that the Bell operating 
companies maintained consistent technical standards and a 
high level of service. Eventually, it would facilitate the creation 
of the interconnected telephone network that would come to be 
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known as the Bell System. Early on, however, interconnection 
remained little more than a visionary dream. Though Bell es-
tablished AT&T as a long-distance subsidiary in 1885, the vast 
majority of telephone calls would continue to take place within 
local exchanges until well after World War I. 
Hubbard's influence upon Bell's business strategy declined 
around 1880, when his leadership was successfully contested 
by shareholders determined to steer a more fiscally prudent 
course. Notable successors included E. J. Hall, a key figure in 
Bell's expansion in the South. Hall did much to institutionalize 
Bell's distinctive business mindset, which disparaged competi-
tion and venerated stability, consensus, operational efficiency, 
and technical expertise. Hall also cultivated support for Bell 
technical standards among sympathetic government officials, 
particularly in state legislatures and state regulatory commis-
sions. Just as the judiciary had shielded Bell from competition 
between 1876 and 1894, so the state governments helped it to 
fend off potential challengers between 1894 and World War I. 
The political entrepreneurship of Bell executives like Hall sig-
nificantly raised barriers to entry in the industry, since it obliged 
Bell's competitors to match its high performance standards. In 
addition, it eliminated the looming threat to Bell's administra-
tive autonomy that was posed by municipal regulation.43 
Bell executives adopted a selective approach to innovation. 
The most pressing technical challenge in late-nineteenth-cen-
tury telephony was what one historian has called the "switch-
board problem." As the number of subscribers in a given tele-
phone exchange multiplied, it became progressively more ex-
pensive to provide customers with a basic level of service— 
reversing the typical pattern in mass-production industries like 
steel and automobiles. The larger the number of subscribers, 
the greater the problem. Several Bell rivals met this challenge 
by automating the switching process. Bell executives, in con-
trast, stuck by manual switching. Prior to World War I, virtu-
ally every telephone call that a Bell subscriber made required 
the personal intervention of a highly trained, female telephone 
operator.44 
Why Bell proved so reluctant to adopt automatic switching is 
an intriguing question. Part of the answer is technical: prior to 
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World War I, no satisfactory method of automatic switching 
had yet been devised. Yet if Bell executives had made automatic 
switching a high priority, it seems likely that this technical 
hurdle could have been more speedily surmounted, as it even-
tually would be in the 1920s. More fundamental were the social 
and cultural assumptions that automatic switching undermined. 
In particular, automatic switching violated the principle of 
"user transparency"—that is, the notion that telephony should 
be kept as simple as possible, requiring of subscribers nothing 
so demanding as the need to dial a number. This assumption 
reflected the sensitivity of Bell executives to the fact that most 
telephone subscribers hailed from the middle or upper classes 
and had come to regard telephone operators as a logical exten-
sion of their household staff. The decision to use the tele-
phone—or so these executives assumed—should be akin to 
ringing a servant to hand-deliver a personal note. "The tele-
phone operator," declared AT&T president Theodore N. Vail 
in 1915, was the "servant of every subscriber, as though she 
was in his office or in his direct employ. . . . There never can be, 
in my opinion, any way devised to get rid of the 'intelligence' 
which at some point in making up the connection is apt to be 
required."45 Not until the 1920s, with the widespread introduc-
tion of the dial telephone, would Bell democratize telephony by 
permitting subscribers to hold a telephone conversation with-
out having to rely on the assistance of operators to make the 
connection.46 
Bell executives proved far more committed to solving the 
problem of long-distance telephony. Here, too, social and cul-
tural assumptions loomed large. Though the market for long-
distance telephony remained decidedly limited, Bell executives 
were driven to secure it by what one historian has aptly termed 
their "almost irrational commitment" to interconnection.47 The 
invention by Bell engineers in the 1880s of the loading coil and 
in the 1900s of audion, the first vacuum tube, were major steps 
toward the realization of this goal. So, too, was the advent, in 
1915, of telephone service between New York and San Fran-
cisco, which demonstrated for the first time the feasibility of 
telephony on a truly continental scale.48 
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The promise of long-distance telephony may have captivated 
Bell executives; yet it proved to be extremely expensive and, in 
large part for this reason, had little appeal for the vast majority 
of telephone subscribers. What they demanded, rather, was 
cheap and reliable service within a limited geographical range. 
The obliviousness by Bell executives to this commercial reality 
encouraged the rise, following the expiration of Bell's patents in 
1894, of a legion of independent telephone firms that offered 
rudimentary, inexpensive telephone service not only in urban 
centers, where Bell was already well established, but also in 
many rural regions that Bell had yet to tap. Independent strong-
holds included St. Louis, Rochester, New York, and countless 
smaller cities and towns in the South and Midwest.49 
It would be a mistake to contend, as some historians have, 
that the independents alone hastened the creation of the ubiq-
uitous national telephone network that we take for granted 
today. This goal would not be attained until after World War 
II and was much facilitated by generous federal subsidies for 
the establishment of telephone service in rural regions. Yet the 
independents did greatly expand the market for telephony, even 
as they confronted Bell executives with a competitive challenge 
that they had no choice but to meet.5 0 
Bell' s strategic response to the independents was coordinated 
by Theodore N. Vail, president of AT&T between 1907 and 
1919. Vail's long career with Bell began in 1878, when Hubbard 
appointed him the first general manager of the Bell Telephone 
Company. Vail left the firm in 1887 and, after a twenty-year 
hiatus, returned in 1907 at the behest of a banking consortium 
led by J. P. Morgan. The Morgan interests had large holdings 
in Bell securities and looked to Vail to end the threat that the 
independents posed to their investments. They were not to be 
disappointed. 
The cornerstone of Vail's business strategy was his commit-
ment to universal service. Universal service for Vail meant 
nothing more, and nothing less, than the connection of all 
existing telephones; it did not necessarily entail either rate 
reductions or the extension of telephony into poorly served 
areas. To popularize interconnection, Vail launched one of the 
earliest public-relations campaigns in the history of American 
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business. Its theme was "one system, one policy, universal 
service," which succinctly expressed Vail's vision of an inte-
grated national telephone network under the supervision of 
AT&T—which, since 1900, had been the parent company of 
the various Bell interests. 
Like many Bell executives, Vail admired technical efficiency, 
disliked competition, and placed great faith in systems engi-
neering. Driven by what historians have come to call the "net-
work mystique," he made the continuous pursuit of technologi-
cal innovation a key corporate goal.51 To translate these values 
into practice, Vail promoted various improvements in technical 
standards, sponsored basic research in telephone technology 
(including long-distance telephony), and systematized the rela-
tionship between AT&T and the various operating companies. 
To build political support, Vail articulated a novel theory of 
corporate governance in a remarkable series of public ad-
dresses. No longer, Vail declared, would AT&T be adminis-
tered as a private enterprise for the benefit of its shareholders; 
henceforth, it was to be a public utility dedicated to the public 
good. 
Vail's strategy proved highly effective. By World War I, it 
had minimized the challenge posed by the independents and 
stabilized the value of AT&T's stock. Universal service was the 
key. Emboldened by Vail's vision of a unified telephone net-
work, AT&T encouraged the interconnection of Bell and non-
Bell telephone exchanges, ending the challenge that the inde-
pendents posed. Moreover, Vail carved out for AT&T an envi-
able political niche. Under his leadership, the attorney general 
joined with Bell executives in 1913 to establish ground rules for 
the industry. This agreement legitimated Bell's dominant mar-
ket position, forestalled (at least for a time) the threat of anti-
trust proceedings, and promulgated a set of principles that 
would structure relations between Bell, the operating compa-
nies, and the independents for over seventy years—until the 
court-mandated breakup of the Bell System in 1984. 
How Vail came to his faith in universal service is an intrigu-
ing question. One likely source was his firsthand familiarity 
with the universalistic mandate of the post-office department, 
where he had worked for a time in the 1870s as superintendent 
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of the railway mail service. Another possible influence was 
Vail's uncle, Alfred Vail, one of the key figures in the early 
history of electric telegraphy and a staunch advocate of gov-
ernment telegraphy. Vail's views were also doubtless shaped by 
his long friendship with Gardiner Greene Hubbard, who had 
hired Vail away from the post-office department in 1878. What-
ever its origins, Vail's ambitious vision was by no means un-
precedented. Indeed, it reinvigorated a long-standing civic tra-
dition in American communicat ions policy that included 
Hubbard's critique of Western Union, Samuel F. B. Morse's call 
for government control of electric telegraphy, and Benjamin 
Rush's vision of a national postal network. By rejecting the 
narrowly commercial business strategy that had so constrained 
Western Union, Vail reinterpreted for the twentieth century the 
expansive rationale for long-distance communications that had 
first found expression in the Post Office Act of 1792. 
In the period between the adoption of the federal Constitution 
and World War I, the innovative process in American commu-
nications followed no consistent pattern. The most fundamental 
technical breakthroughs—electric signaling in the 1840s, voice 
transmission in the 1870s—emerged in highly unusual contexts 
that provide few obvious lessons for students of innovation 
today. Equally idiosyncratic was the conceptual advance that 
hastened the creation of the modern postal system in the years 
immediately following the adoption of the federal Constitution. 
Yet certain themes do stand out that may provide some 
guidelines for the future. Most major innovations originated 
outside of existing institutions. In telegraphy and telephony, 
technical breakthroughs spawned entirely new industries. In 
mail delivery, a conceptual advance invested an existing insti-
tution with a sweeping new rationale. The principal exception 
was long-distance telephony, which, though important later on, 
had yet in this period to be widely diffused. 
Equally instructive is the relevance to the innovative process 
of what might best be termed the organizational culture. Insti-
tutions like the Bell System that defined their mission in broad, 
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universalistic terms proved to be not only more enduring but 
also more innovative than institutions like Western Union, which 
did not. Even the post-office department enjoyed, for a time, a 
reputation for innovation, even though in the end this proved 
impossible to sustain. It is hardly surprising that key decision 
makers at the post-office department and Western Union dis-
trusted innovation. Institutions, after all, tend to resist change. 
Yet it may prove of some value to recall that, at least in 
communications, competition could prove a major stimulus for 
the diffusion of new methods and ideas. This was true even in 
the Bell System, where executives like Vail had championed 
innovation as a business strategy. At no point, however, was 
competition synonymous with an absence of government regu-
lation. Indeed, the history of American communications pro-
vides compelling evidence that stability and change need not be 
necessarily opposed and that highly regulated institutions can 
foster innovation, particularly if their leadership articulates a 
compelling vision and commands not only the necessary tech-
nical and financial resources but also the levers of power. 
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